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Joint Patenting Amongst
Companies}Exploring the Effects of
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R&D alliances and previous experience with the sharing of intellectual property rights are
expected to have signiﬁcant effects on joint patenting by alliance partners. Although so far un-
researched, this is both an intuitively and theoretically appealing subject because joint
patenting could relate to the possible outcome of an important group of alliances. However,
the main explanation for differences in joint patenting of R&D partners is found in their
experience with the joint patenting process itself. Copyright# 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to explore the
relationship between inter-ﬁrm R&D partnerships
and joint patenting for companies that are engaged
in formal R&D collaboration. Exploratory studies
such as the current paper can be important
contributions to the literature when they test the
boundaries of existing theoretical explanations
and help to move research into uncharted areas.
This paper tests four hypotheses related to prior
literature concerning experience of companies with
inter-ﬁrm partnering and it extends the growing
literature on cooperative R&D with the evaluation
of the effect of formal R&D cooperation on joint
patenting.
A starting point for this study can be found in
the large body of literature that points at the
growing importance of a wide variety of inter-ﬁrm
partnerships, a growth that has manifested itself in
particular since the 1980s. That same literature
also suggests that joint R&D is one of the most
popular reasons for forming alliances in many so-
called high-tech industries and emerging technical
areas (see Hagedoorn, 1993; Mowery, 1988;
Mytelka, 1991). Commensurate with the growth
of cooperative R&D we also observe an increase in
the number of jointly owned patents (Hicks and
Narin, 2000). An initial screening of US patents
suggests that by the end of the 1990s about 8% of
US patents in a number of high-tech sectors was
jointly owned by two or more companies. This
percentage seems to be the result of a gradual,
unrecognized increase in the willingness of ﬁrms to
jointly share their property rights in technical
discoveries. The choice to share property rights
seems to reﬂect an important milestone in sus-
tained inter-ﬁrm cooperation since the subsequent
development and beneﬁts of the invention would
also likely be shared. That is, ﬁling a joint patent
may be seen as an important landmark signifying
the successful completion of inter-ﬁrm cooperative
R&D and a milestone suggesting future collabora-
tion as the discovery is moved toward commercial
success.
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The premise to be examined is as follows: One of
the more important intermediate outcomes of
R&D is a patent. These patents provide the holder
with valuable intellectual property rights that can
be used to develop a unique competitive advan-
tage. Given the importance of joint R&D in inter-
ﬁrm partnering, joint patenting could be a valu-
able outcome of joint R&D once companies have
built up some experience in working with others
and/or with a speciﬁc partner.
In the following we will ﬁrst describe both joint
patenting and R&D partnering in detail to provide
the background for the hypotheses. This is
followed by the discussion of four hypotheses that
stipulate the expected relationship between R&D
partnerships and joint patenting, as well as the
possible effect of previous joint patenting activities
on joint patenting at a later stage. In order to test
our hypotheses we will construct a relatively large
data set that merges a number of databases on
R&D partnerships, joint patenting, and a variety
of company indicators. Given the speciﬁcs of our
data and our research questions, we will discuss
and use four different statistical analyses: a
standard ordinary least square regression model,
a log-linear model, a Poisson model and a negative
binomial model. This methodological discussion is
followed by sections that present and discuss the
results of our exploratory study. Finally, we brieﬂy
discuss some of the major conclusions from this
research.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND
HYPOTHESES
We believe it is of particular importance for
an exploratory study to ﬁrst discuss its major
subjects, here joint patenting and R&D partnering,
before presenting elements of theory development,
hypotheses and operational measures.
Joint patenting refers to the condition where
two or more patent-holders (e.g. companies) hold
property rights to a registered discovery. In that
situation two or more co-assignees are understood
to have jointly ﬁled a patent with a patent ofﬁce.
These joint patents are quite different from other
patent agreements, such as cross-licenses and
pooled patents. Cross-licensing usually occurs
when patents of different companies ‘block’ each
other because each patent infringes one or more
patents of another company. In that case, a cross-
licensing agreement, based on patent-exchanges or
‘swaps’, gives the right to use these patents by
parties that are subject to the exchange agreement.
For pooled patents, companies decide to pull
together patents, that do not necessarily infringe
each other’s patents, in order to improve products
using patents of different patent-owners. Both,
pooled patents and cross-licenses, are based on
separately ﬁled individual patents. In both in-
stances the companies decide to ‘share’ the
property rights of speciﬁc patents to avoid
blocking the patent rights of inventions that were
made by individual companies.
A joint patent, however, is a speciﬁc form of a
standard patent where the ‘owners’ or assignees
are two or more separate companies that share the
property rights of a particular jointly ﬁled patent.
Joint patenting expresses a mutual relational trust
between separate companies that acknowledge
their shared intellectual property rights and the
joint ownership of an invention, an artifact or a
new technology that is registered as a patent.
The diversity in forms of formal cooperation
and their different organizational settings does
also demand that one attempts to deﬁne as exact
as possible which forms of inter-ﬁrm cooperation
will be studied. In the following we will refer to
R&D alliances and R&D partnerships as a set of
different forms of collaboration where joint R&D
is at least part of the agreement between distinct
companies. (We will use concepts such as alliances
and partnerships as synonyms that indicate a
similar degree of collaboration between compa-
nies.) There are two major sub-categories of these
formal R&D alliances: R&D joint ventures and
joint R&D agreements. An R&D joint venture
refers to the combination of the economic interest
of at least two distinct companies in a jointly
owned organization. The jointly owned ﬁrm is
expected to have a number of standard company
objectives (including R&D as a major objective)
and operates as a separate business unit. Proﬁts
and losses of the joint venture are usually shared
according to equity investment of the parent-
companies. Although R&D joint ventures were the
dominant form of R&D partnering during the
1970s (about 70% of R&D alliances), the domi-
nant form of R&D partnering in the 1990s are the
joint R&D agreements (about 80%) (Hagedoorn
and Narula, 1996). These joint R&D agreements
refer to incomplete contracts (Williamson, 1996)
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between companies that establish and regulate the
joint undertaking of temporary R&D projects with
shared resources. R&D pacts, joint development
agreements and long-term research contracts are
examples of these joint R&D agreements.
So far numerous studies suggest a dramatic
increase in both formal and informal R&D
cooperation among ﬁrms (see e.g. Bouty, 2000;
Hagedoorn, 1993; Hagedoorn and Narula, 1996;
Osborn and Baughn, 1990; Von Hippel, 1988).
Based on the well established relationship between
R&D and patents (see Griliches, 1998) we can also
expect a relationship between the joint R&D
efforts of ﬁrms and joint patenting. Here we are
concerned with sustained formal cooperative
relationships between ﬁrms rather than the in-
formal cooperation that naturally emerges as
scientists and engineers from different ﬁrms con-
sult one another to solve their individual technical
problems (e.g. Bouty, 2000).
Prior work on formal partnerships typically has
also sought to link antecedents to alliance out-
comes, either the overall success of the partnership
(e.g. Geringer, 1991; Glaister and Buckley, 1999)
or directly to the bottom line of one or more
sponsors (Balakrishnan and Koza, 1993; Hage-
doorn and Schakenraad, 1994). Others have
suggested that most alliances are intended for
speciﬁc purposes, such as R&D, and that a speciﬁc
partnership between ﬁrms may well be embedded
in a larger set of relationships (Gulati, 1995a, b;
Heide and Miner, 1992; Levinthal and Fichman,
1988; Saxton, 1997). This embeddedness could be
important for our understanding since the speci-
ﬁcally measured outcomes from alliances intended
to conduct joint R&D could be viewed not as
isolated outcomes but as part of a pattern of
sustaining relationships among ﬁrms that en-
courages trust among these companies. Speciﬁcally
this prior work yields a set of expected relation-
ships among experience and setting factors when
predicting possible alliance outcomes such as joint
patenting.
Experience of Companies with R&D Partnering
Affecting Joint Patenting
A substantial part of the literature stresses that the
success of a company in inter-ﬁrm partnering is to
a large extent based on its experience with alliances
(e.g. Barkema et al., 1997; Kale and Singh, 1999;
Anand and Khanna, 2000). The more experienced
a company is in establishing formal alliances, the
more opportunities are created to further develop
existing linkages (Park and Ungson, 1997) and to
enter into future partnerships (Dyer and Singh,
1998; Gulati, 1995a; Powell et al., 1997; Oster,
1992). Beyond learning who to form an alliance
with, how it should be administered and when an
alliance should be formed, ﬁrms with more
alliances may increase their reputation and attract
more desirable partners (Powell et al., 1997).
Based on the increased experience and the
growth of relevant managerial capabilities that
companies develop over time, they can also decide
that they can afford to take some risk in
collaborating with other companies. This calcu-
lated risk based on the experience with a number
of companies implies that experienced companies
are more likely to extend their R&D partnerships
with others into long-term in-depth R&D colla-
boration. One particular dimension of such an
extended form of R&D collaboration could be the
joint ownership of the results of these formal
collaborative efforts. In that case, companies can
decide not to individually allocate their joint
inventive output into different patents but to pool
the results of some of these alliances by means of
shared intellectual property rights.
Prior working experience with R&D partner-
ships would lead companies to extend their joint
patenting with others because their experience
builds up capabilities in managing these relation-
ships. Thus, there should be a positive relationship
between the general experience with R&D partner-
ing and joint patenting:
Hypothesis 1:
There is a positive relationship between the general
experience of companies with setting up R&D
partnerships and their involvement in joint
patenting.
History of R&D Collaboration Between Partners
Affecting Joint Patenting
Research by Gulati (1995a) stresses the positive
effect that past partnering experience of pairs of
companies has on the probability of their future
relationships. Earlier work by Heide and Miner
(1992) had already shown that the history of prior
relations between companies, if understood in
terms of the frequency of their contacts, can have
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a positive effect on the nature of their future
relationship. Speciﬁcally, the contribution by
Heide and Miner (1992) suggests that companies
are willing to add new dimensions to their
collaboration if previous cooperation has gener-
ated positive results. Levinthal and Fichman
(1988) also found somewhat similar results with
regard to the effect of prior relations on new
relations between the same partners. Their re-
search reveals that once companies have gone
through a difﬁcult, initial period of collaboration,
in which they learn how to operate alliances,
they gradually initiate more complex relationships
with the same companies. These contributions are
consistent with Kogut’s (1989) expectation that
prior experience of formal collaboration with
multiple contacts between partners encourages
reciprocity and mutual concessions. This should
also yield more enduring linkages across the
different stages of R&D.
Although there are differences, these studies
imply that shared experience encourages compa-
nies to gradually add new dimensions to their
alliances. We submit that shared intellectual
property rights through joint patenting could
reﬂect such an extra dimension of collaboration.
For instance, joint patenting would suggest that
companies have taken another step beyond ordin-
ary collaboration in one or more research projects
as they choose to unify their property rights
through the ownership of inventions born from
their collaboration.
Related to this effect of the previous contacts on
the extended relationship between companies is the
issue of trust. Relational trust is based on the
experience of interaction between two or more
separate companies (Ring and van de Ven, 1992).
Relational trust is developed further by means of
multiple contacts between the same companies.
Gulati (1995b), Nooteboom et al. (1997) and
Saxton (1997) suggest that prior relationships
create relational trust between companies as they
enrich their collaboration. Gradually this rela-
tional or interorganizational trust is expected to
become institutionalized trust that inﬂuences the
content of the exchange between partners (Zaheer
et al., 1998). We submit that in the context of
formal, joint R&D projects this institutionalized
trust can lead to shared intellectual property rights
for the results of joint R&D by separate compa-
nies. Based on this interpretation of the literature,
both multiple contacts between companies and
their increased institutionalized trust will have a
positive effect on the joint patenting between these
companies. Hence:
Hypothesis 2:
There is a positive relationship between the degree
of R&D partnering between companies and their
joint patenting.
Experience with Joint Patenting Affecting Joint
Patenting
In the previous sections we emphasized the
possible effect of institutional trust through formal
R&D alliances and experience with these partner-
ships on joint patenting. However, it has to be
stressed that the relationship between inter-ﬁrm
R&D partnering and joint patenting is not
necessarily of a direct nature. Joint patenting is
just one of the possible results of R&D alliances.
As with so many other aspects of company
behaviour, it might also be the experience of
companies with a particular activity, in this case
joint patenting itself, that has a positive effect on
the propensity of companies to engage in joint
patenting. This does not necessarily imply a
certain path dependency but it does reﬂect the
effect of experience and learning how to deal with
other companies in the process of joint patent
application. As companies have engaged in an
increasing number of joint patenting agreements
they are expected to have learned how to arrange
such patent applications. Assuming that compa-
nies are rational, we can expect that already a
small number of such joint patenting arrange-
ments will indicate to the companies whether this
is an instrument of intellectual property rights that
they intend to apply frequently or not. Hence:
Hypothesis 3:
There is a positive relationship between the general
experience of companies with joint patenting and
their joint patenting at a later stage.
The linkage between experience with joint
patenting and joint patenting at a later stage may
reﬂect both the experience between speciﬁc part-
ners and their decision to use joint patenting in the
past. That is, relational trust represented in prior
joint patenting would yield subsequent joint
patenting. This concerns the trust coupled with
the expertise of jointly ﬁling derived from previous
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joint patenting agreements. In that case, prior
speciﬁc experience of pairs of companies with joint
patenting, their interaction and the multiple
contacts between two particular companies and
their R&D personnel, is expected to have a
positive effect on the degree to which these
companies are willing to continue to jointly own
intellectual property rights. Therefore,
Hypothesis 4:
There is a positive relationship between the degree
of previous joint patenting of speciﬁc pairs of
companies and the joint patenting of the same
partners at a later stage.
POPULATION, DATA AND VARIABLES
In order to test the hypotheses, we had to ﬁrst
construct and later merge two data sets: one on
jointly owned patents and one data set on R&D
partnerships. For the data on jointly owned
patents we acquired a speciﬁc data set from CHI
Research Inc. on US patents (co-assigned patents)
of companies for the period 1989–1998 in patent
classes that coincide with the industry-classiﬁca-
tions in the CATI database on alliances (see
below). The period 1989–1998 was chosen because
the end of the 1980s mark the start of a period of
gradual growth in the number of co-assigned
patents (see also Hicks and Narin, 2000). The
general population of jointly owned patents that
forms the starting point for our research comprises
a total of 9585 patents, with 20 569 assignees and
13 052 pairs of assignees or pairs of companies.
From this data set we selected the joint patents
owned by companies from North America (USA
and Canada) and Europe (EU and EFTA). We
excluded joint patents with companies from
other countries because in many countries,
Japan and Korea in particular, it is difﬁcult to
detect whether two ‘ﬁrms’ mentioned as co-
assignees of patents are actually a part of the
same complex ‘company’ such as a Keiretsu or
a Chaebol. For North American and European
companies we could check whether co-assignees in
these patents are indeed two separate companies
through Disclosure.
As part of our study focuses on the role of R&D
partnerships we used the MERIT-CATI data set
for information on R&D alliances of North
American and European companies (see below).
After matching the two data sets we found that
1122 pairs of companies in the CATI data set were
also present in the data set with 13 052 pairs of
companies with jointly owned patents. The next
step was to ﬁnd the speciﬁc pairs of companies that
formed an R&D partnership before the year their
latest joint patent was granted. This reduced the
number to 226 jointly owned patents with 78 pairs
of North American and European companies that
are co-assigned to these patents. In other words,
these 78 pairs of companies can have multiple
jointly owned patents after their latest R&D
partnerships and they can have multiple jointly
owned patents before their latest partnership.
Also, the companies in these 78 pairs can have
joint patents with other companies (1122minus
226 joint patents) and R&D partnerships with
other companies (958minus 254 R&D partner-
ships that these 78 pairs share).
Consequently, the unit of analysis in our
research is the pairs of companies that have at
least one jointly owned patent following an R&D
alliance between a pair of companies.
Variables
The dependent variable in our research is the
number of jointly owned patents by pairs of
companies after their last partnership was formed
during the period 1989–1998.
The general experience with R&D partnerships
reﬂects the average number of all previous partner-
ships of both companies in a pair, previous to their
latest partnership during the period 1989–1996.
The specific experience with R&D partnerships
reﬂects the number of partnerships between the
companies in a pair, previous to their latest
partnership during the period 1989–1996.
The general experience with joint patenting
considers the average number of the previous total
joint patenting of both companies in the period
1989–1996, prior to the joint patents taken for the
dependent variable.
The specific experience with joint patenting is the
number of co-assigned patents of the two compa-
nies in a pair in the period 1989–1996, prior to the
joint patents taken for the dependent variable.
Control Variables
For this study we apply a number of variables
that could inﬂuence both R&D partnering of
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companies and joint patenting. Previous studies
indicate that the size of companies affects the
degree to which companies enter into alliances and
secure their inventive output through patents.
There is a well-established body of literature that
stresses that alliance formation increases with the
size of companies, see Berg et al. (1982), Duysters
and Hagedoorn (1995), Ghemawat et al. (1986),
Hagedoorn (1995), Mowery (1988) and Mytelka
(1991). The study of the effect of size of companies
on their patenting goes back to the classical
Schumpeterian argument which argues that R&D
and patent activity of companies increases with
ﬁrm size (Cohen and Levin,1989; Scherer,1965,
1984; Mansﬁeld, 1986; Mueller, 1986). We assume
that this size-effect is not only relevant for patents
in general but also for jointly owned patents. Size
is the log of the average size (revenues in 1995) of
both companies in the pairs.
The relation between R&D intensity of compa-
nies and patenting is well established and has been
studied extensively. Studies by Bound et al. (1984),
Hausman et al. (1984), Kamien and Schwartz
(1982) and Scherer (1984) indicate a direct relation
between R&D effort and patenting output,
although the relation may not be linear. We
assume a similar effect for the R&D of companies
on jointly owned patents. With growing R&D
expenses, these R&D intensive companies are
also interesting partners for R&D partnerships.
R&D intensity is measured as the average R&D
expenses in each pair as a percentage of total
revenues in 1995.
We also control for the number of patents that
companies have applied for during the period
1989–1996. First, similar to the effect of R&D
intensity, we expect an effect of the number of
patents, that a company has, on its attractiveness
as an R&D partner. Second, the experience that
companies have with patenting increases their
familiarity with the patent application process
which is expected to positively inﬂuence their
propensity to enter into joint patenting agreements
with other companies. We took the log of the
average number of US patents of both companies
in the pairs during the period 1989–1996 as an
indicator for this variable.
High-tech sectors are, almost by deﬁnition,
sectors with a high-patenting intensity and a
disproportionate share in industry-wide patenting
(Griliches, 1998; OECD, 1992). Also, high-tech
sectors have a disproportionate share of alliances
in general and R&D alliances in particular
(Hagedoorn and Narula, 1996; Mytelka, 1991;
Osborn and Baughn, 1990; Osborn and Hage-
doorn, 1997; Oster, 1992). Therefore, we control
for the role of high-tech sectors and the large share
of R&D partnerships in these sectors, which are
expected to affect the degree of joint patenting by
companies. The degree of high-tech R&D partner-
ing is the average percentage of high-tech partner-
ships in R&D partnerships of both companies
during the period 1989–1996. According to the
OECD (1992) and subsequent OECD publica-
tions, high-tech sectors are defense, aircraft and
space, information technology sectors, pharma-
ceuticals and heavy electrical equipment, all with
an average sector R&D intensity of over 10%.
Nearly, 30% of the pairs of companies in this
sample are active in these high-tech sectors.
Differences between international and domestic
partners might affect the joint patenting behaviour
of companies. Conventional understanding of
alliances suggests that, given the lack of informa-
tion on possible international partners, the costs
involved with obtaining this information, the cost
of control in long-distance arrangements, and the
difﬁculty with developing trust with international
partners, companies prefer domestic alliances.
This is expected to be even more so when R&D
becomes a more central element in cooperation
(Buckley and Casson, 1988; Contractor and
Lorange, 1988; Hagedoorn and Schakenraad,
1994). Then, R&D efforts critical to the future
innovative success of companies have to be
guarded against potential opportunism in alli-
ances. This suggests that also a disproportionate
share of joint patenting is found in domestic R&D
partnerships. The domestic nature of R&D part-
nerships is the average percentage of all the
domestic R&D partnerships of both companies
in their total number of R&D partnerships during
the period 1989–1996. Domestic partnerships are
registered according to the country of origin of the
headquarters of companies
Different organizational forms of partnering,
such as joint R&D agreements and joint ventures,
play an important role in the management and
organization literature on inter-ﬁrm cooperation
(Dyer and Singh, 1998; Gulati, 1995a; Osborn and
Baughn, 1990; Osborn and Hagedoorn, 1997;
Oster, 1992). We can expect that these forms
also have a different impact on joint patenting.
From a traditional transaction cost theory inspired
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perspective one could expect that a joint venture is
a quasi ﬁrm-like setting where companies collabo-
rate in a separate organizational entity where
relational trust between parent-companies devel-
ops gradually as the joint venture is engaging
in a growing number of activities (Hagedoorn,
1993). The R&D of the jointly owned company
is, given the multitude of tasks of a joint
venture, embedded in many other activities.
Relational trust between partners is a central
element in the long-term perspective of a joint
venture and the joint patenting of the parent
companies seems a logical consequence of the
trust-building that emerges within a joint venture.
In contrast to this, contractual R&D agreements
are by deﬁnition incomplete contracts and, given
the nature of incomplete contracts, one could
submit that relational trust cannot be developed
up to the level where companies would aim at joint
patenting.
Collaboration in contractual R&D agreements
is expected to fall short in joint patenting as
partners will make sure they can, given the
uncertainty surrounding incomplete contracts,
separate the intellectual property rights related to
inventions from their partner(s). Companies will
perform joint R&D through their alliance but the
translation of this R&D into intellectual property
rights will take place at each of the individual
parent-companies. Hence, joint ventures, that
provide better legal protection and an adequate
organizational setting, are expected to lead to
more joint patenting than joint R&D agreements.
However, we can also follow another line of
argument. As suggested by Gulati (1995b) con-
tractual agreements are based on knowledge-based
trust where equity is no longer necessary as a
safeguard in the alliance. Relational trust between
partners emerges through multiple contacts and as
this relational trust develops, there is less need for
safeguards through equity sharing. Then, rela-
tional trust can just as well develop in contractual
agreements as in joint ventures.
Given the importance attached to organiza-
tional features of inter-ﬁrm partnering, we intro-
duce two variables to control for the effect that
different forms of inter-ﬁrm R&D partnering
might have on joint patenting. The ﬁrst of these
control variables is the share of joint ventures in
the total number of R&D partnerships of both
partners in pairs of companies during the period
1989–1996. The other control variable, share of
specific joint ventures, refers to the share of joint
ventures in the R&D partnerships made
among the pairs of companies during the period
1989–1996.
Data Sources
Data on joint R&D partnering were obtained from
the MERIT-CATI database on technology alli-
ances. This data bank contains information on
thousands of technology-related inter-ﬁrm alli-
ances, collected through various sources: specia-
lized journals which report on business events and
newspaper and journal articles. The data bank
contains information on each agreement and some
information on companies participating in these
agreements. Alliances are deﬁned as common
interests between independent (industrial) partners
which are not connected through (majority) own-
ership. In the CATI database only those inter-ﬁrm
agreements are being collected that contain some
arrangements for transferring technology or joint
research. Joint research pacts are clear-cut exam-
ples. Information is also collected on joint ventures
in which new technology is received from at least
one of the partners, or joint ventures having some
R&D programme. Mere production or marketing
joint ventures are excluded. In other words, this
material is primarily related to R&D collaboration
and technology cooperation, i.e. those agreements
for which a combined innovative activity or an
exchange of technology is at least part of the
agreement. Additional information on this data-
bank can be found in Hagedoorn (1993).
The database on co-assigned patents was con-
structed by CHI Research Inc. from a subset of
patents issued by the US Patent and Trademark
Ofﬁce (USPTO). The selected patents ﬁt the
following criteria:
1. They are so-called Type 1 (utility) patents
granted in the years 1989–1998.
2. Patents are co-assigned to at least two compa-
nies that do not share a common parent
company (organizations other than companies
are excluded).
3. Patent classiﬁcations for these patents coincided
with the industry classiﬁcation of the MERIT-
CATI database.
Data on co-assigned patents are available at
the level of individual companies, patent classes
and SIC-related product groups, and countries.
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Additional detailed information on the database
and the selection of patents is available from the
authors.
Data on the number of patents for one of the
control variables was obtained from the US Patent
and Trademark Ofﬁce. Although this US data
could imply a bias in favour of US companies and
against non-US ﬁrms, the group of non-US
companies in this sample represents a group of
ﬁrms that are known to patent world wide.
Furthermore, the literature suggests several other
reasons to take US patents as an indicator.
Frequently mentioned are the importance of the
US market, the genuine patent protection offered
by US authorities, and the level of technological
sophistication of the US market which makes it
almost compulsory for non-US companies to ﬁle
patents in the USA. See Patel and Pavitt (1991) for
a discussion on the use of US patent data.
For information on ﬁrm size and R&D expen-
ditures we used the well-known databanks of
Compustat and Worldscope. In order to aggregate
patents of subsidiaries to the corporate level we
used information from Disclosure and the Tech
Line database to identify parent companies and
their subsidiaries.
METHODS AND SPECIFICATION
OF ANALYSIS
Because the observations of jointly owned patents
are non-negative integer-valued random count
data, the classical linear regression models based
on the principle of ordinary least square could
provide an incomplete description of the jointly
owned patent data. The reasons for the deviation
of count data from the classical linear regression
assumptions are twofold. The shape of the
observation set does not correspond to a linear
model and the disturbances of a linear model, with
a discrete dependent variable with strictly non-
negative values, cannot be normally distributed
(Gourieroux et al., 1984b). To provide a metho-
dological improvement over the classical linear
(OLS) regression models, models for analysing
jointly owned patents require a framework based
on a discrete probability distribution.
The statistical benchmark model for the analysis
of cross-section discrete data is the Poisson model
(Hausman et al., 1984; Cameron and Trivedi,
1986). With the distribution of the number of
jointly owned patents speciﬁed as Poisson,
we are able to estimate the probability of the
number of jointly owned patents between pairs
of companies after they established their last
partnership.
However, the Poisson regression model has an
important restrictive assumption. It is based on
the assumption that the conditional mean and
the variance of the dependent variable, given the
explanatory variables, are equal. Many empirical
distributions of count data, though, have a
variance exceeding the mean and are thus over-
dispersed relative to the Poisson rate. The negative
binomial regression model provides a mechanism
for incorporating overdispersion in the count
model (Gourieroux et al., 1984a, b; Hausman
et al., 1984; Cameron and Trivedi, 1986). This
regression model embeds the Poisson distribution
in a more general distribution that allows the
variance of the process to differ from the mean.
A natural basis for testing the adequacy of the
Poisson regression model is the variance–mean
equality, conditional on explanatory variables.
Classical standard methods to test the failure of
restrictions are the likelihood ratio test and the
Wald test. Cameron and Trivedi (1990) have
proposed a number of regression-based tests for
overdispersion in the Poisson regression model.
They found that the optimal test is the one that
tests the assumption of variance–mean equality,
var(yi)=mi, as null hypothesis, against the alter-
native hypothesis H1 : var(yi)=mi+ag(mi), where
g(mi)=mi or g(mi)=mi
2, where yi is dependent
variable. If a=0, then the evidence shows the
existence of mean–variance equality in the count
data set.
For comparison purposes, four versions of the
model speciﬁcations are estimated below: a linear
regression model, a log-linear model, a Poisson
model, and a negative binomial model. The
classical linear model group is estimated by OLS
and the discrete probability distribution group by
the maximum likelihood method. We compare the
OLS estimates with those of the speciﬁc econo-
metric count data models to show the extent to
which the effects of the explanatory variables on
the number of jointly owned patents is robust and
whether the effect of changes in speciﬁcations of
the model makes a difference. The second inves-
tigation focuses on the improvements that are
made by using the statistical procedure that
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recognizes that joint patenting is measured as
discrete non-negative integer data.
Observations regarding the general and speciﬁc
experience with R&D partnerships and the general
and speciﬁc experience with joint patenting are
conversed in log variables. However, this trans-
formation has one limitation, i.e. the logarithm
transformation of zero values is not possible.
Following the work of Hausman et al. (1984), we
set these speciﬁc transformed values to zero and a
dummy variable is used to correct for this solution.
The other explanatory variables are also measured
in logarithms, in percentages, or as dummies.
These procedures leave the relationships between
the jointly owned patents and each of the
explanatory variables in percentage terms, either
by deﬁnition of the variable itself as a percentage,
or by expression in logs.
RESULTS
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics and correla-
tion coefﬁcients for all variables. Table 2 displays
estimation results of the various statistical models
for jointly owned patents of pairs of companies. In
models 1–4 we estimated the effects of the
experience variables and control variables on the
number of jointly owned patents of pairs of
companies after their last R&D partnership. In
models 5–8, we added the effects of the control
variables for average size of the pair of companies
and their average R&D intensity. In order to
choose between the Poisson and negative binomial
model, we tested the null hypothesis that the
underlying model is Poisson with the mean–
variance equality, against the alternative hypoth-
eses that the model is a negative binomial with
variance=mi+ami or variance=mi+ami
2 with
mi=E[yi|Xi,b] , corresponding with negative bino-
mial models I and II, respectively (Cameron and
Trivedi, 1986).
Table 3 shows the results of the regression-based
tests for overdispersion of Poisson models. The
tests show evidence of overdispersion in the data,
since ua is signiﬁcantly different from zero in the
second regression-based test. We estimated, there-
fore, the negative binomial model II which allows
the variance process to differ from the mean
according to the results of the second regression-
based test. The corresponding likelihood-ratio test
statistics for models 3, 4 and 7, 8, are 8.578585 and
8.055587, respectively. These statistics are highly
signiﬁcant. However, the estimation of the addi-
tional overdispersion parameter a in both models 4
and 8 weakens the rejection of the Poisson model.
However, we cannot reject the Poisson distribution
in favour of the negative binomial model II as their
estimates are quite similar in size and magnitude.
Also, the standard errors under the Poisson are
substantially smaller. This reﬂects the consequence
of imposing the mean–variance equality restriction
of the Poisson distribution. These ﬁndings are
consistent with those of Hausman et al. (1984) and
Cameron and Trivedi (1986).
In hypothesis 1 we argued that the general
experience with R&D alliances of companies will
stimulate their number of jointly owned patents.
However, in all models the general experience with
R&D partnerships is insigniﬁcantly associated
with the number of jointly owned patents. We
also hypothesized that the speciﬁc experience of
pairs of companies with R&D partnering through
partnerships with each other, will contribute
positively to their number of jointly owned patents
(hypothesis 2). The estimates of this speciﬁc term
in all models are insigniﬁcantly different from
zero. These results suggest that the experience of
companies with R&D alliances, either in a general
or in a pair speciﬁc context, does not have
predicting power with regard to pairs of compa-
nies with these characteristics having more jointly
owned patents. Thus, hypotheses 1 and 2 are not
supported.
Table 2 also shows the results for the analyses
testing hypotheses 3 and 4. As predicted, the two
experience terms with jointly owned patents, the
general experience with jointly owned patents and
the speciﬁc experience with joint patenting of
particular pairs of companies, are positively
associated with the number of jointly owned
patents for a pair of two companies at a later
date. The general experience with joint patenting is
signiﬁcant in all our models, while the speciﬁc
experience is only signiﬁcant in the classical linear
model (models 1 and 5) and in the Poisson model
(models 3 and 7). The estimation results from the
log model (models 2 and 6) and the negative
binomial model II (models 4 and 8) moderate the
relationship between the speciﬁc experience with
joint patenting and the number of jointly owned
patents. Most of the joint patenting experience
variables in the count data regression tell the same
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story. The number of jointly owned patents
depends positively on the experience with joint
patenting and not on the experience with R&D
alliances.
As far as the control variables are concerned,
our ﬁndings are quite straightforward: none of the
control variables appear to play a role of any
signiﬁcance in the analysis. We also considered a
number of possible interaction effects of various
variables (not reported here) but none of the
interaction effects were signiﬁcant.
DISCUSSION
Our results clearly indicate that, somewhat sur-
prisingly, the degree of joint patenting of compa-
nies is not directly related to their experience with
formal R&D partnering, not even for a group of
companies that is heavily involved in both joint
patenting and formal R&D collaboration through
alliances. If one accepts that joint patenting is a
possible indicator for the success of inter-ﬁrm
cooperation, then this ﬁnding appears to tie into
some contributions to the alliance literature that
are skeptical about the positive effect of alliance
experience on alliance outcome (Inkpen, 1995;
Shortell and Zajac, 1988; Simonin, 1997). Speciﬁ-
cally, neither the general or the speciﬁc experience
of companies with establishing a variety of
different partnerships is a sufﬁcient condition for
success. Our ﬁndings particularly suggest that
increasing numbers of inter-ﬁrm R&D alliances
do not imply that this experience will be translated
into increasing joint patenting with partners. It
should be stressed that our results do not indicate
that formal R&D partnering does not generate any
results or that companies engaged in R&D
alliances are unable to learn from their alliances.
After all, it is still possible that partners do
individually learn from their experience through
a multitude of alliances. Through these alliances
companies can appropriate knowledge that might
be translated into separate patents, new technol-
ogies, new products or new production processes
and managerial skills. However, the results suggest
caution in suggesting that R&D alliances are
merely successful or not successful.
The more positive results found for the effect of
previous experience with joint patenting indicates
the importance that should be attached to the roleT
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of experience with joint patenting as such. The
history of companies in joint patenting with a
variety of partners indicates that ﬁrms may
strategically select the joint patenting option and
that they may have mastered the necessary knowl-
edge relevant to arrange joint patent applications.
In particular the result for the effect of general
experience with joint patenting seems to imply that
companies are able to learn from their previous
experience of how to apply for joint patents with a
variety of partners.
A somewhat speculative explanation for the
positive role played by joint patenting experience
points at the possible effect of informal networks
of R&D personnel from different companies. The
role of informal networks is stressed in Bouty
(2000) and von Hippel (1988) who argue that
researchers are embedded in informal networks
that cut across organizational boundaries and that
they routinely share information with fellow
researchers that they trust. In Thompson’s terms
(Thompson, 1967) they are members of a ‘complex
conﬁguration’ of informal networks that fre-
quently have formal consequences. Bouty’s
(2000) study also suggests a tension between the
desire to protect the ﬁrm and its technological
capabilities and the need to collaborate to solve
problems. Her work shows that the relationships
between researchers is built over time and only via
successful and trustful exchanges will researchers
actively collaborate. The tension between protec-
tion of technological capabilities on the one hand
and the practical need to collaborate on the other
may be partially resolved by the development of
joint beneﬁts to the researchers and their ﬁrms as
represented by a joint patent. In that case the
propensity of companies to enter into joint patent
agreements could be the result of informal
networks at the level of R&D departments
in a history of collaboration with a variety of
companies where formal R&D partnerships do not
play an active role.
Returning to joint patenting experience as such,
it is important to note that our results are quite
unambiguous when it comes to understanding the
relation between the general experience with joint
patenting. However, our ﬁndings regarding the
speciﬁc experience of joint patenting companies
are not that clear. Based on our current research it
appears that the speciﬁc experience with joint
patenting does not necessarily have the same effect
on the joint ownership of patents as the general
experience of companies with joint patenting.
These results could be statistical artifacts caused
by certain sensitivities in some of the statistical
models due to small numbers. Although, given the
exploratory nature of this study and the newness
of these subjects, future research is required for all
topics in this contribution, the role of speciﬁc
experience within pairs of joint patenting compa-
nies seems particularly important for subsequent
study.
CONCLUSIONS
As so many other exploratory studies, our research
does not generate the results that one would expect
based on related research, extension of current
research, and simple intuition. Formal R&D
partnerships, such as joint ventures and R&D
pacts, may generate several results for the partici-
pating companies but the sharing of intellectual
property rights through joint patenting does not
seem to be among the beneﬁts. This does indicate
that our understanding of both inter-ﬁrm colla-
boration and the R&D and innovation processes
within companies is in need of substantial im-
provement. Apparently there are no simple one-
on-one relationships, where one phenomenon (e.g.
increasing joint R&D) simply leads to another (e.g.
increasing joint R&D output), as one might expect
from much of the current alliance and innovation
literature.
However, our research does indicate one im-
portant ﬁnding. Again, it appears that previous
experience of companies does guide their beha-
viour. Simplistic as this might seem, the bottom-
line might be that companies that once have built
up some experience in joint patenting with other
companies, through a variety of joint actions
Table 3. Tests for Overdispersion in Poisson Model
Var(yi) = mi + ag(mi),
ua Standard error t-ratio
Model 3
g(mi) = mi 0.22470 0.32224 0.697
g(mi) = mi
2 0.18420 0.08963 2.055
Model 7
g(mi) = mi 0.24121 0.30678 0.786
g(mi) = mi
2 0.16342 0.07945 2.057
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outside the realm of formal partnering, continue to
do so. In other words, as already found for so
many other aspects of company behaviour, ﬁrms
appear to follow certain routines based on
previous experiences and these routines to a large
extent explain the variance in a population of
companies. Once companies have learned how to
share property rights with other companies, they
continue to jointly patent with other companies.
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